Russia has shown a will and ability to implement cyber warfare as part of their national strategy.
The French Service Regulations of 1913 (influenced by the so-called “cult of the offensive”) might had been worded differently, had they not seen new technology through the lens of old dogmas.Ĭhina has gone the (cognitive) mile and seems poised to truly exploit the cyber domain. Where the West discusses legislation and what “should be”, they are discussing what “is” and “can be”. Where the West is attempting to apply outdated cognitive models to create order from chaos, others seek to exploit the chaos to create new strategies. They are applying sound strategic analysis to a domain that is deceptively familiar, but in its complexity still new. Others are on our trail and are meticulously looking for possibilities to use the domain to disrupt “the existing westernized world order”. In the process we have become dependent on services of a human-made “organic” system. Creating new possibilities on the fringes of a system most of us hardly understand. Still, we have done so with an aim of augmenting existing capabilities, and “interconnection between decision-makers, sensors, and effectors» has been the main effort. In many respects, and in many confrontations, this has served the West well. Network Centric Warfare (NCW) seems within grasp. Technological maturity has become the defining characteristic of western military power. Thus, we are approaching the problem of our current operational reality. Our potential adversaries, like Russia, acknowledge this. And technology is no replacement for strategy and military thought.
Technology does not win wars – people win wars. Of course, technology is not deterministic. But, just as “simple” inventions like the machine-gun transformed the battlefields of the past, cyber has a profound impact on our current and future operational reality. Technological developments, like cyber, may not change the nature of war. The operational environment and character of warfare will always reflect the most pervasive trends. As the 1955 documentary told us: “The Future is now”. And there is no clear-cut line between future war and the current operational environment. The internet is old news, but the exploration and exploitation of associated effects, like Internet of Things (IoT) or artificial intelligence (AI), has merely started. Amid the digital age, we can comfortably state that cyber is as much a “trend” as electricity. When addressing cyber warfare, one often ends up walking a fine line between the current operational environment and technological trends characterizing the narrative of future war.
Introduction – Cyber Warfare and its relevance To this end, Russia has a few lessons to offer. A key argument in this article is that the West must re-focus its attention from technology as a deterministic power, to its utilization for strategic ends.
Russia is still technologically inferior to the West but has hacked the code of translating capabilities to effects. Technological maturity is no panacea if we are unable to utilize it to create a convincing and functional means-ends chain between cyber and political goals. The authors suggest NATO needs to reassert itself in the cyber domain. We argue that Russia has risen from the technological backwaters of the 90’s to become a great cyber-power – challenging state and military capabilities the West has taken for granted. As this article shows, Russia has implemented cyber as an integral part of its strategic framework, and demonstrated its effectiveness in the attainment of political objectives on several occasions. Some states have adapted to this reality already, while others struggle. But cyber has proven to have a profound impact on our operational reality today. Cyber warfare is often described as an integral part of future wars.